Black Box deals with the one aspect of air travel that we would rather not think about, which is crashing. It is a focus on air safety, and why, ironically, it is no accident. It also describes the role of the air accident investigator, which is firstly, to deduce how the accident happened, and then to make procedural and dynamical recommendations for action based on these conclusions. Approximately 1500 airline passengers die every year in accidents. Put into perspective, this is not very many at all, given that 8000 people die on the streets of Germany each year. Statistically, flying is three times safer than taking a train, and thirteen times safer than travelling by car. But research is not concentrated on car accidents, because it is obvious how they happen. Aviation is a more complex world, and public fears do not diminish, although it is a part of everyday life for many.
There is a myriad of explanations as to why an aeroplane will crash. Metal fatigue is one, of which the best example is the Comet, where early attempts at pressurised cabins ended in a series of seemingly inexplicable crashes. It was only after a common factor between these accidents was spotted that the mystery was solved. In 1988, an Aloha Airlines 737 had an 18-foot section of the fuselage roof ripped off at 24000 feet, just like the top of a sardine tin.
A breakdown in the communication network is another common accident-maker. When a DC10 crashed near Paris in March 1974, the cause was identified as a defective cargo door latch - the mechanism common to all DC10s had to be revised, though only after a series of incidences. This breakdown resulted from intergovernmental tensions; the inability of organisations and countries to admit mistakes and design flaws. Disorganised government departments; petty internal rivalries and competition are also to blame.
The ATR72, a French turboprop, is another classic example. Its wing was engineered such that it set a precedent in terms aerodynamics. Airlines like this because of the fuel-saving capabilities. But this particular design was well adapted to accumulating ice, which destroys an aerofoil, compromising lift, which leads to a crash. But tensions between France and America, as a result of industrial rivalry - France refused to licence the new 747 if America did not rescind its 'criticisms' - meant that a fatal design flaw caused recurrent accidents in cold weather.
We cannot change natural weather systems. Where there are many freak weather conditions, thunderstorms, incidences of clear air turbulence and so on, there is cause for concern. In March 1966, a Boeing 707 crashed near Mount Fuji, as a result of the winds that create the 'rotor effect' - air is pushed up the mountain, and when it moves down onto the leeward side, it spins and eddies about a horizontal axis that is fatal for passing planes. Modern technological advances can be both help and a hindrance. We can detect such problems by remote sensing - satellite observation systems and radar, which aid the pilot in the decision-making process.
With the advent of computer systems, fly-by-wire technologies and 'glass cockpits', the pilot has been removed from being the centre of control to part of a computer system. Computers may become too advanced, and in the case of the Airbus A320, launched in 1988, this was so. The pilot's instincts were now almost made redundant, but this meant that in certain cases, conflicts of opinion building up between them and the computers. The aircraft thought that it was doing one thing, and in reality it was doing another - caused by software errors, or the programming itself. Increased computerisation leads to long periods of inactivity. Inactivity breeds boredom, and coupled with the long hours, fatigue and jetlag, creates a lethal combination.
However, it is worth noting that 80% of all crashes take place within 0.6 miles of the airport, i.e. on take-off and landing. Another interesting point is that in 95% of air crashes, people will survive if there is no fire. The best example was the 1985 Manchester crash, where toxic gases coming from the burning cabin plastics and fabrics asphyxiated people, and many were found lying around the exits, unable to make the final step. Thus, it was recommended that different seat fabrics were to be used, but even these do not solve the problem.
However, marketing plays a large role in air travel today. Passengers would rather have a television screen in the seat back rather than a smoke-hood, or reinforced seats, because we do not want to think about crashing. Of course, cost is also an important factor. Cars are designed to crash, whereas aeroplanes are not, although attitudes are changing, as people become more educated.
The book is compelling reading, and is a must for every air-traveller today. It is an objective view of air accident investigation, because a journalist with wide-ranging interests has written it, and written it well. The revised version, Black Box 2: the Final Investigation, is available from amazon.co.uk, priced at ISBN 0752221183.
